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Note
The Three Faces of Eve: Tortious Interference Claims
in the Employment-at-Will Setting
Rebecca Bernhard*
Celia Zimmerman had a successful career at Direct Fed-
eral Credit Union (Direct)-until she learned she was preg-
nant.1 Zimmerman's supervisor, David Breslin, failed to grant
the accommodations she needed by forcing her to work during
doctor-required rest periods.2 In addition, Breslin stripped
Zimmerman of her management responsibilities, moved her
into a smaller office, and excluded her from management meet-
ings and other activities that she had organized and partici-
pated in prior to her pregnancy.3 After pursuing a discrimina-
tion claim with the State authority,4 Zimmerman sued Direct
and Breslin on several claims including tortious interference
with advantageous relations.5 Although the court noted that
"[clommon sense suggests that an employee may not sue her
employer for interfering with its own contract,"6 it nonetheless
* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Labor
Studies, San Francisco State University. The Author appreciates the extraor-
dinary editorial work of Christy Szitta and is especially grateful for Professor
Befort's guidance. Most importantly, thanks to Bill and Isabelle Bukovsan for
giving everything meaning.
1. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir.
2001).
2. Id. at 73.
3. Id. at 73-74.
4. Id. at 74. The administrative proceedings with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination were preempted when the plaintiff filed
suit in Massachusetts state court; the defendants subsequently removed her
claim to federal court. Id.
5. Id. The elements of a tortious interference claim are (1) a valid and
existing contract; (2) the interfering third party had knowledge of the contract;
(3) the third party engaged in an intentional act that caused the contract to be
breached; (4) the act was not justified; and (5) an injury occurred.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
6. Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 76.
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allowed Zimmerman's claim to proceed.7 Why did the court
abandon common sense?
In a tortious interference claim, the employee must assert
that the supervisor or manager8 improperly interfered and
caused the employer to dismiss the employee. 9 If an employer
can dismiss for any reason or no reason at all, which is true in
an at-will setting,'0 common sense indicates that the supervisor
or manager should be able to carry out the termination, and
also for no reason. A plaintiff in a tortious interference claim
must therefore assert that the supervisor or manager was not a
party to the at-will contract and that he" improperly carried
out the termination.
The objections to a tortious interference claim in this con-
text are twofold: (1) an at-will contract cannot be interfered
with;12 and (2) the supervisor is indistinguishable from the em-
ployer. 13 Thus, while a tortious interference claim may provide
relief to the discharged employee, is it an end run around the
7. Id. at 78.
8. The words "supervisors" and "managers" have distinct meanings
within the field of labor and employment law. Supervisors are generally those
employees who carry out the employer's policies and goals but do not make the
policies. Managers generally have responsibility for developing and imple-
menting employer policies. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) (2000) (listing responsibilities typical of a "supervisor"); see also 29
C.F.R. § 541.102 (2000) (listing responsibilities typical of a "manager"). For
the purposes of this Note, the terms will be used synonymously since the legal
distinctions are not relevant to determining agent and principal liability. See
infra Part H.C.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
10. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-76 (1908) (affirming the at-
will rule that allows an employer to terminate an employee for any reason),
overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); see also
HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 133
(Albany, N.Y., John D. Parsons, Jr. 2d ed. 1886) ("When continuance of service
is discretionary, either party may put an end to it ad libitum.").
11. Although women are also quite capable of being abusive managers,
most managers are still male. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcS, HOUSEHOLD
DATA NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED tbl.A-19 (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.bls.gov. For simplicity, this Note uses the pronoun "he" to avoid
the unwieldy combination "he or she."
12. E.g., Hicks v. Clyde Fed. Say. & Loan, 696 F. Supp. 387, 389 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (finding that a third party cannot interfere in the employment-at-will
setting because an enforceable contract does not exist); Alam v. Reno Hilton
Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993) (concluding that an at-will-
employment agreement is not a contract that can be interfered with).
13. E.g., Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.
2001) (noting that case law supports the "intuition" that an employee "may not
sue her employer for interfering with its own contract").
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at-will doctrine?
This Note will examine tortious interference in the em-
ployment-at-will setting and consider whether allowing these
claims improperly erodes the at-will doctrine or whether these
claims put a proper restraint on otherwise abusive supervisors
and managers. Part I places the claim in a legal context by de-
tailing the three intersecting bodies of law: contract, tort, and
agency law. Part II analyzes the practical application of these
doctrines to claims of tortious interference. Part III proposes a
solution to the apparent inconsistencies in the tortious inter-
ference claim while respecting the legal and policy implications
of all three bodies of law involved.
The proposed solution recognizes the overlap of agency,
tort, and contract law in the tortious interference claim. An at-
will contract can only be improperly interfered with by a third
party. By adhering to the principles of agency law, a supervi-
sor can be separated from the entity-employer in the most
egregious situations, and therefore the at-will doctrine is not
undermined when supervisors are merely implementing stan-
dard business decisions.
I. SEEING THREE FACES IN THE TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE CLAIM
The United States has few laws governing the relationship
between the employee and employer. 14 The majority of those
laws deal primarily, if not exclusively, with the existing em-
ployment relationship, as opposed to its termination. 15 When it
comes to severing an employment relationship, the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine dominates, 16 notwithstanding a growing
14. The United States has few employment regulations as compared to
other industrialized nations with similar economies. See, e.g., Samuel Estrei-
cher, Unjust Dismissal Laws in Other Countries: Some Cautionary Notes, 10
EMP. REL. L.J. 286, 287 (1984) (discussing several areas where the United
States provides less protection for employees in comparison to other coun-
tries).
15. For example, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) primarily gov-
erns the relationship between employees, labor unions, and employers; it does
not explicitly mandate just-cause terminations (although the NLRA does for-
bid discrimination based on union activities including termination of employ-
ment for such activities). 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). Additionally, the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regulates hours, wages, and child labor but not
discharges. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). The Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) protects the physical environment of the workplace. 29 U.S.C. §§
651-679 (2000).
16. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.1 (2d ed.
2002] 1543
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number of exceptions. 17 This doctrine is premised in part on
the belief that both parties are equal and can freely choose to
enter into, maintain, and terminate an employment contract.18
1999).
17. Scholars have argued for judicial revision of common law rules to pro-
vide employees with greater private remedies for wrongful discharges. See
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1828-30 (1980); see
also Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaim-
ers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 330 (1992) ("Today, however, the [at-will] rule's
detractors are numerous ... ."). Courts have apparently heeded the scholars'
calls because a growing number recognize some exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine, most notably the public policy exception. E.g., Lucas v. Brown
& Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a public pol-
icy exception to the at-will rule when the alleged basis for termination is so
"repugnant" as to offend the public); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp.,
710 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) ("adopt[ing] the public policy excep-
tion to the at-will termination rule"); Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d
1330, 1336-37 (Cal. 1980) (recognizing a public policy exception to the at-will
rule when an employer discharges an employee for refusing to commit a
criminal act); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn.
1987) (holding that an at-will employee fired for refusing to violate the law has
a cause of action for wrongful discharge). Additionally, certain laws prevent
discrimination with regard to, inter alia, employee discharges. For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits terminating an employee on the ba-
sis of the five protected classes: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). In addition, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act applies the same limits to decisions based on age, 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1) (2000), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects dis-
abled employees from discharge based on disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2000), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 623(J) (Supp. 2001). Even within these excep-
tions, however, liability is placed on the corporate entity, not the individual
acting on behalf of the corporation. See Note, supra, at 1839-44.
18. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (noting that "the
employer and employee have equality of right"), overruled in part by Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Note, supra note 17, at 1825 ("The
at will rule conformed with a premise of complete social freedom ... ."). It is
debatable whether this premise was true in the early years of United States
economic history when employers were not large corporations and the individ-
ual employer and individual employee could engage in one on one bargaining.
See generally TERESA L. AMOTT & JULIE A. MATrHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND
WORK: A MULTICULTURAL EcoNOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 291 (1991) (providing a picture of unequal economic and social condi-
tions during the growth of wage work in the United States). As the industrial
revolution expanded the workplace, however, individual employees' bargaining
power lessened; the NLRA was enacted in part because Congress recognized
that inequality. See generally Note, supra note 17, at 1828-30 (discussing the
theory of unequal bargaining power). As a legal fiction, a corporation can only
act through its duly authorized agents. Thus, because the employee is not on
an equal footing with the corporation, the at-will doctrine puts a great deal of
power into the hands of the individual agents acting on behalf of the corpora-
tion. Within the limits provided by the minimal regulations governing em-
1544
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This premise supports the common-sense assertion that a su-
pervisor cannot interfere with an at-will employee's contract. 19
Nevertheless, many courts have determined that corporate
managers can tortiously interfere with an employee's con-
tract.20 Although tortious interference requires an outside ac-
tor who is not a party to the contract or business relationship,
21
employers are often legal fictions who act only through their
duly authorized agents.22 As such, when applied in the context
of the employee relationship, managers serve as the primary
corporate agents. Managers, however, can be separated from
the corporation according to established agency laws regarding
the scope of their employment and the motives behind their ac-
tions.23 Thus, if a manager is acting outside the scope of his
ployment relationships, see supra note 15, employers maintain a great deal of
control over and flexibility with respect to their employees.
19. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.
2001).
20. Id. at 78; see also Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 261 (D.
Del. 1996) (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts when recognizing a
tortious interference claim for at-will contracts); Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros.,
802 F. Supp. 956, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that an at-will relationship
is a contract for the purposes of a tortious interference with contract claim).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
22. Corporations can be held liable for various employment-law violations,
see supra note 15, but it is individuals who carry out the corporate actions.
These individuals are generally protected from personal liability for corporate
acts taken on behalf of their employers. See Nordling v. N. States Power Co.,
478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 1991) (noting that to expose corporate officers to
personal liability would "chill [these employees] from performing their duties
and would be contrary to the limited liability accorded incorporation"); see also
Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 606 (Or. 1968) (recognizing the economic
and business reasons for shielding officers and employees from liability for ac-
tions taken on behalf of the corporation). As stated, corporations are legal en-
tities, but they are also legal fictions. For more detail, see the discussion in-
fra Part I.C and notes 93-99. See also Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-
Will Employment and Tortious Interference with Business Relations: Rethink-
ing Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Context, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
491, 493 (2001) [hereinafter Long, Disconnect] (highlighting the fact that the
corporate structure makes it difficult to separate the corporation from upper
management).
23. Generally, employees are not shielded from liability for their own in-
tentional tortious acts, even when their employer is also held liable under the
respondeat superior theory. See Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d
202, 208 (D.R.I. 1998) (concluding that respondeat superior liability does not
absolve the employee-wrongdoer); see also Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Mgmt., Inc.,
595 N.W.2d 476, 480-81 (Iowa 1999) (citing Sit-Set, A.G. v. Universal Jet
Exch., Inc., 747 F.2d 921, 929 (4th Cir. 1984)). In Sit-Set, the plaintiff sued
the defendant and the defendant's company for breach of contract and fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. The Sit-Set court noted that officers can be held
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
employment or with improper motives, he could be considered a
third party for purposes of a tortious interference claim.24
The employment-at-will doctrine, coupled with the immu-
nity from personal liability for various employment law viola-
tions,25 creates fertile ground for abuse. As long as a mean,
nasty supervisor does not violate Title VII or similar laws,26 he
can make employees' lives extremely miserable, ultimately in-
flicting the workplace equivalent of capital punishment-
termination-just because he wants to. In this context it is not
surprising that discharged employees-searching for a remedy
not found in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)27 or
other laws-have pursued tortious interference claims against
abusive supervisors. 28
jointly and severally liable. 747 F.2d at 929 ("Corporate officers may of course
be liable jointly and severally with their corporation for obligations arising out
of tortious conduct of the officers .... ") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 343 (1957)).
24. To determine whether an agent is acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment, the court will examine several factors, including but not limited to
whether the conduct is of the sort the agent is employed to perform; whether
the conduct occurs within the authorized time and location of the agent's em-
ployment; whether the conduct serves the principal; whether the act is com-
monly done by other similar agents; and whether the principal should rea-
sonably expect the conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-229
(1957).
25. For example, individual supervisors are not personally liable under
Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
26. See statutes cited supra note 17.
27. Given the decline in unionism, few employees have the protection of
the just-cause discharge obligations that are virtually standard in collective
bargaining agreements. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor, Union Members Summary (Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http//www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm. See generally Befort, supra
note 17, at 331.
28. Tort claims can provide a plaintiff relief where the statutes do not.
See Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs have found refuge in what one scholar calls "the white meat of em-
ployment related claims." Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business
Relations: "The Other White Meat" of Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 863,
864 (2000) [hereinafter Long, White Meat]. These tort claims can also hold in-
dividuals acting on behalf of their employers personally liable. See, e.g., Zim-
merman, 262 F.3d at 74. The tortious interference claim is an example. In
Celia Zimmerman's case, she sued her supervisor personally under tortious
interference, claiming that he improperly interfered with her relationship with
her employer-the corporation. Id. The court agreed that the supervisor's
conduct interfered with Zimmerman's ability to perform her contractual obli-
gations for her employer. Id. at 78. The supervisor-defendant degraded and
humiliated Zimmerman during management meetings, assigned her demean-
ing work, and refused to grant her the accommodations her pregnancy necessi-
1546 [Vol.86:1541
THE THREE FACES OF EVE
Thus, this Note now individually examines the three bodies
of intersecting law relevant to tortious interference in at-will
employment: contract law, which controls the employment-at-
will doctrine; tort law, which governs claims of tortious inter-
ference; and agency law, which defines managers' status and
scope of authority as well as their liability.
A. CONTRACT LAW AS APPLIED TO THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP
The employer-employee relationship is considered a con-
tractual relationship,29 regardless of the existence of a formal
written contract. Under the traditional rule, an "oral contract
of indefinite duration" is considered an at-will contract.30 Most
employment relationships are oral agreements. 31 Thus, it is
not surprising that the at-will rule serves as the default rule
when courts consider employment disputes. 32
The at-will doctrine is a rule of construction; it is the pre-
sumption of the employment relationship, but like most pre-
sumptions, it is rebuttable. 33 The clearest evidence that can
rebut the at-will presumption is the existence of a written em-
ployment contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement,
that contains a provision for just-cause discharge. 34 Courts,
however, have begun to recognize that other actions taken by
tated. Id. at 73-74. This improper conduct prevented Zimmerman from secur-
ing the contractual obligations and advantages offered to her by her employer.
Id. at 78.
29. Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Nev. 1993)
("Theoretically, employment-at-will is a contractual relationship governed by
contract law."); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, § 1.27.
30. ROTHSTEIN ETAL., supra note 16, § 1.27.
31. Id.§ 8.2.
32. By the end of the nineteenth century, absent evidence indicating a
specific duration of the relationship, employment was considered terminable
at-will-by the employer or the employee-for any or no reason. See WOOD,
supra note 10, § 133; see also Mark E. Brossman et al., Beyond the Implied
Contract: the Public Policy Exception, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing, and Other Limitations on an Employer's Discretion in the At-
Will Setting, in 2 HANDLING WRONGFUL TERAIINATION CLAIMs 15 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series, 2001). Since H.G. Wood an-
nounced the at-will doctrine in his treatise, it has been unquestioned as the
presumptive rule. Befort, supra note 17, at 329.
33. ROTHsTENETAL., supra note 16, § 8.1; Befort, supra note 17, at 332.
34. See ROTHSTEN ET AL., supra note 16, § 8.1 (stating that the "National
Labor Relations Act... gave employees federally protected rights to organize,
join unions, and bargain collectively. Eventually, most collective bargaining
agreements contained protection from discharge except for 'just cause.'").
2002] 1547
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1541
the employer may also be sufficient to rebut the at-will rule.35
For example, one of the earliest cases to find evidence rebutting
the at-will presumption was Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan.36 The employer in that case issued a writ-
ten just-cause discharge policy, which the court found to be a
legally enforceable contract.3 7 In another landmark case, Pugh
v. See's Candies, Inc., the California Court of Appeal recognized
an employee's contractual rights to continued employment
based on, inter alia, the past actions of his employer.38 Finally,
in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, an employee handbook
that contained language regarding discipline and for-cause dis-
charge was sufficient to constitute a unilateral contract binding
on the employer and employee despite the retention of at-will
status in the handbook.39 The court said that a violation of the
disciplinary terms was sufficient to impose liability on the em-
ployer for its contract breach.40 Thus, as Professor Stephen Be-
fort noted, employer policies and promises can provide courts
with a legal basis for enforcing those policies and promises.41
Although all states except Montana 42 recognize the at-will
doctrine as the default rule in employment settings, not all
states accept that this rule provides a valid and enforceable
contract. 43 Nonetheless, these states still categorize the at-will
rule within the body of contract law."4
35. Befort, supra note 17, at 331-34.
36. 292 N.W.2d 880, 893 (Mich. 1980).
37. Id.
38. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
39. 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn. 1983).
40. Id.
41. See Befort, supra note 17, at 339-47 (describing how unilateral con-
tract theory and promissory estoppel have served as doctrinal bases for enforc-
ing handbooks).
42. Montana is the only state with a just-cause statute, thus making it
the only state that does not recognize at-will as the default rule. MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 914 (2001).
43. See, e.g., Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev.
1993) (concluding that an employment-at-will agreement is not a contract that
can be interfered with); Hicks v. Clyde Fed. Sav. & Loan, 696 F. Supp. 387,
389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (finding that a third party cannot interfere in the employ-
ment-at-will setting because there is not an enforceable contract); cf Francis
v. Lee Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 717 (Haw. 1999) (certifying that Hawaii
does not recognize tortious breach of contract actions in the employment con-
text unless two conditions are met, and if those two conditions are met the
employment is not at-will).
44. See, e.g., Alam, 819 F. Supp. at 911; see also ROTHSTEIN ETAL., supra
note 16, § 1.27.
1548
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For those at-will employees without the benefit of hand-
books or other express promises from their employers, the pre-
dominant opinion until the 1980s was that an at-will contract
could not be breached.45 If the contract was terminable at the
will of either party, then any reason was sufficient to terminate
it; either party's actions to that end were within the bounds of
the contract, and as a consequence, there could be no breach.
46
Since that time, certain exceptions beyond the handbook cases
have developed to limit the reach of the employment-at-will
doctrine-notably the public policy exceptions.47
The vast majority of states that recognize exceptions to the
at-will rule do so in four public policy categories: 48 (1) refusing
to perform an illegal act;49 (2) exercising a legal right;50 (3)
whistle-blowing;51 and (4) performing a public obligation.52 Ad-
ditionally, a number of federal and state laws codify public pol-
icy against discrimination in connection with employee dis-
charges. 53 Outside these exceptions, however, the at-will rule
45. See generally ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, §§ 8.2-8.7 (discussing
various conditions supporting a breach, none of which involve at-will employ-
ees).
46. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Or. 1975) ("Such termination
[for any or no reason] by the employer or employee is not a breach of [an at-
will] contract ... ."). See generally ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, §§ 8.2-
8.7.
47. See Befort, supra note 17, at 332-33.
48. Brossman et al., supra note 32, at 49-65. Not all states that recognize
public policy exceptions do so on all four grounds. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 16, § 8.9. Of the states that have a public policy exception, the majority
recognize an exception for refusal to perform an illegal act and for exercising a
statutory right. Befort, supra note 17, at 332-33.
49. E.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn.
1987) (holding that an at-will employee fired for refusal to violate the law has
a cause of action for wrongful discharge).
50. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (recogniz-
ing a cause of action for an employee discharged for filing a workers compen-
sation claim).
51. E.g., Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krinko, Inc., 901 S.W.2d 147, 152
(Mo. 1995), reprinted in 11 IER Cases (BNA) 808 (recognizing a cause of action
for wrongful discharge when an employee reports illegal corporate activity).
52. E.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (finding a public pol-
icy exception for an employee discharged for serving on a jury).
53. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), amended by 29 U.S.C. §
623(J) (Supp. 2001). Examples of relevant state statutes include the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.13 (2002), and the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12900 (West 1999 & Supp.
2002).
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dominates.54 Thus, although contract principles guide courts in
analyzing claims in the employment-at-will setting, the reme-
dies available under traditional contract theory vary according
to whether an individual court concludes that the at-will rela-
tionship is an enforceable contract.55
B. TORT LAW AND THE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM
Although a tort is generally defined as a civil wrong out-
side the realm of contract law,56 the body of tort doctrine is
nevertheless "a field which pervades the entire law."57 Thus,
tort law intersects with contract doctrine, and tortious interfer-
ence claims explicitly unite the two bodies of law. State courts
consider tortious interference claims in the employment-at-will
setting as either interference-with-contract claims or interfer-
ence-with-business-relations claims.58 The basic premise of the
tortious interference claim 59 is straightforward: A third party is
liable if he interferes with one party to a contract and thereby
causes that party to breach his agreement with the other party
to the contract. 60 The elements of a tortious interference claim
are (1) a valid and existing contract (or a reasonable expecta-
tion of continued business relations); (2) a third-party defen-
dant who knows of this contract; (3) an intentional act by the
third party that is a significant factor in causing the breach of
the contract; (4) a lack of justification for the intentional act;
and (5) an injury-in-fact.61 Courts in different jurisdictions
54. See ROTHSTEINETAL., supra note 16, § 8.1.
55. See id. § 8.21.
56. See BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1496 (Deluxe 7th ed. 1999).
57. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2-3 (5th ed. 1984),
quoted in BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1496 (Deluxe 7th ed. 1999).
58. States label the claims differently based primarily on whether they
consider at-will relationships as valid and enforceable contracts or as relation-
ships with an expectation of continued business dealings. See Long, Discon-
nect, supra note 22, at 499-500 (discussing the utility of tortious interference
with business relations in the at-will setting despite the Restatement's treat-
ment of an at-will contract as valid and subsisting and citing many cases that
rely on the Restatement in either tortious interference with contract or tor-
tious interference with business relations); cf. Long, White Meat, supra note
28, at 865 (noting that tortious interference claims "seek to protect not only
existing contractual relationships, but also prospective contractual and busi-
ness relationships").
59. This Note refers to the claims collectively as "tortious interference"
unless a distinction is necessary.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
61. E.g., Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 260 (D. Del. 1996);
Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 909, 911 (D. Nev. 1993); McGanty v.
1550 [Vol.86:1541
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have applied each element inconsistently in the employment-
at-will context.
The first element requires a valid contract. Although con-
tract law provides the background for analyzing employment-
at-will relationships, it does not follow that every at-will rela-
tionship yields an enforceable contract. 62 Some jurisdictions re-
fuse to consider employment-at-will relationships as contrac-
tual relationships capable of being disrupted through tortious
interference.63 Others recognize a claim of tortious interference
with contract because "the [at-will] contract is valid and sub-
sisting" until it is terminated. 64 Yet others recognize only the
claim of tortious interference with business relations, rejecting
contract-based assertions but simultaneously endorsing reli-
ance on the continuation of an employment relationship that is
subject only to the will of the actual parties to the relation-
ship.65 Although determining the existence of a valid contract
is necessary for any contract claim an employee may bring, do-
ing so is also an important threshold test for the tort claim of
interference. 66
Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 844 (Or. 1995); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 766 (1977) (explaining and illustrating the rule pertaining to in-
tentional interference with performance of a contract by a third party).
62. Cf ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CONTRACTS § 4.2, at 556 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (noting that where parties agree that "perform-
ance is terminable at will by either party, the agreement is not a contract at
all").
63. See, e.g., Alam, 819 F. Supp. at 911 (noting that an employment-at-
will agreement is not a contract that can be interfered with); Hicks v. Clyde
Fed. Say. & Loan, 696 F. Supp 387, 389 (N.D. IU. 1988) (finding that a third
party cannot interfere in the employment-at-will setting because an enforce-
able contract does not exist); cf Francis v. Lee Enter., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 717
(Haw. 1999) (certifying that Hawaii "does not recognize tortious breach of con-
tract actions in... employment [situations]").
64. Cf Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 261 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977) as authority to recognize tortious interference
claims for at-will contracts); Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., 802 F. Supp. 956, 963
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that an at-will relationship is a contract for the
purposes of a tortious-interference-with-contract action).
65. See, e.g., Varrallo v. Hammond Inc., 94 F.3d 842, 848 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that under New Jersey law, an at-will employee may assert a claim of
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage without even hav-
ing a contractual right). In some respects, this method resembles that taken
in the jurisdictions that adopt a promissory-estoppel approach to the enforce-
ment of handbook provisions. Cf Befort, supra note 17, at 343-45 (explaining
how courts apply the promissory-estoppel approach and discussing the advan-
tages and disadvantages of doing so).
66. See, e.g., Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 260 (listing the existence of a valid
contract as the first element of a tortious interference claim).
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The second element-the third-party requirement-has
also produced conflicting results. Some states flatly refuse to
consider a managerial or supervisory employee as a third party
for this purpose, although the courts' reasons are not consis-
tent.67 For example, in Halvorsen v. Aramark Uniform Ser-
vices, Inc., a California court examined the scope of a manager's
privilege in the context of the tortious interference claim.6 8 The
Halvorsen court ultimately concluded that an absolute privilege
would best protect the employer's interest in "full and open par-
ticipation of [its] management."69 In McGanty v. Staudenraus,
the Oregon court took a formalistic approach and separated the
third-party inquiry from the improper interference inquiry.70
McGanty held that when a supervising employee is acting
within the scope of his employment, he is not a third party to
the contract.71
Other jurisdictions incorporate agency law on a case by
case basis to determine whether a supervising employee is in-
deed a third party for the purpose of an interference claim.72
67. See Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 390
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the manager's privilege to interfere with an
at-will contract between the employer and the employee is absolute); West v.
Troelstrup, 367 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that because
an entity must act through its agents, a director is considered to be a party to
a contract for the purposes of an interference claim and not an outside party);
Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that a
supervisor is legally justified in interfering with an employee's at-will rela-
tionship because the corporate employer vested the supervisor with its author-
ity to terminate); McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 847 (Or. 1995) (find-
ing that the third-party requirement is a threshold test that must be satisfied
before any inquiry regarding improper motive takes place).
68. 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387-90.
69. Id. at 390.
70. 901 P.2d at 847.
71. Id. at 849. In its determination of whether an improper interference
exists, the McGanty court's decision not to examine the supervisor-employee's
motive under the third-party test imposes a substantial burden under the sec-
ond element of a tortious interference claim. See supra text accompanying
note 61 (listing the elements of a tortious interference claim).
72. Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring that a
defendant-employee exceed the bounds of her authority to be considered a
third party for an interference claim); Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 263-64 (relying
on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to decide whether an employee acted
outside the scope of his employment in determining whether a claim of tor-
tious interference with contract should proceed); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1043 (Ariz. 1985) (rejecting an absolute privilege
for supervisors because it would allow them to interfere in employment rela-
tionships with impunity); Richards v. O'Neil, 2000 WL 640314, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2000) (mem.) (noting that an agent who does not act "legitimately"
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The Restatement (Second) of Agency sets out a scope of em-
ployment test that mirrors the approach courts take under
their tort analysis for determining whether a manager is a
third party for the purpose of an interference claim.7 3 For ex-
ample, in Finley v. Giacobbe, without explicitly citing the Re-
statement, the Second Circuit, applying New York law, en-
gaged in a scope of employment analysis and found
organizational charts and other employer records to be relevant
factors in determining whether the defendant employer was
authorized to hire and fire the plaintiff.74
Similarly, in Hunter v. Board of Trustees of Broadlawns
Medical Center, the Iowa court noted that the defendant did not
follow authorized standard procedures when reducing the staff,
and concluded that a jury might find he exceeded the qualified
privilege afforded to managers in the context of a tortious inter-
ference claim.75 Although the Hunter court was not explicit
about the significance of its finding that the defendant abused
his privilege by not following authorized procedures, the court
considered the abuse of the manager's privilege sufficient to
find the defendant to be an outsider for the purposes of the tort
claim. 76 As a result, the supervising employees' improper mo-
tives can satisfy both the third-party requirement-insofar as it
takes the supervisor-defendant outside the scope of his em-
ployment-and the interference element.77
may be liable under an interference claim); Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, 565 A.2d
285, 290-91 (D.C. 1989) (concluding that when an employee's supervisor acts
with malice, the supervisor can be considered a third party for the purposes of
an interference claim); Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481
N.W.2d 510, 518 (Iowa 1992) (holding that a defendant's status as an em-
ployee "does not ipso facto make him a party to any contracts" for the purpose
of a tortious interference claim); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d
498, 506 (Minn. 1991) (recognizing that "a corporate officer or agent may be
liable for tortious contract interference if he or she acts outside the scope of his
or her duties"); Eib v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 633 S.W.2d 432, 436
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that corporate officers are privileged to induce a
breach of contract unless they are acting with improper motives, such as for
their own personal benefit).
73. E.g., Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 263; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 228-229 (1957). The relevant elements of the test are whether the
conduct is the kind the agent is retained to perform, whether the conduct oc-
curred within authorized time and space limits, and whether the conduct is
performed at least in part to serve the principal. Id. § 228.
74. 79 F.3d at 1295 & n.10.
75. 481 N.W.2d at 518.
76. Id.
77. Although the cases all suggest a slightly different position on the rele-
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The third element-an intentional act by the third party
that is a significant factor in causing the breach of the con-
tract-provides another interesting point of controversy. If the
act concerns termination, it may be deemed within the defen-
dant's scope of employment, depending on the jurisdiction.78 If
the plaintiffs case is built around an intentional action that a
manager is authorized to take, the plaintiff will have difficulty
satisfying the third-party requirement of the second element.7 9
In jurisdictions that refuse to view employee-agents as third
parties under any circumstances, the parties usually focus their
arguments on the fourth element-the motive behind the act-
and how the act is defined could make or break a plaintiffs
case.80 As the court noted in Eggleston v. Phillips, "Whatever
the [defendants'] motives ... their positions gave them the au-
thority to recommend the termination of the plaintiff ..... 81
The requirement under the fourth element that the act be
improper, or without justification, leaves the greatest room for
confusion. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 767 pro-
vides a list of factors to be balanced when considering whether
an act is improper.8 2 Many courts still focus on whether the act
vance of motive or the degree of malice necessary to find that a supervisor-
defendant is a third party for the purposes of the tortious interference claim,
the courts generally fail to separate this issue from the application to the im-
proper interference element. E.g., Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., 802 F. Supp.
956, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 518. Critics reject this use of
motive by courts because it collapses the fourth element-improper purpose
with no justification-into the second element-the third-party requirement.
See Long, Disconnect, supra note 22, at 506-15.
78. Compare Ives v. Guilford Mills, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197-98
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that the defendant acted outside the scope of his
employment in terminating the plaintiff and was not, therefore, a party to the
contract), with Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding the supervising employee acted within the scope of his employment
when he terminated the plaintiff). Although the Eggleston court confined its
inquiry to the fourth element of the tortious interference claim, it is reason-
able to infer that many tortious interference claims arise from terminations
and the plaintiff relied upon that termination for the intentional act. See id.
79. Compare Eggleston, 838 S.W.2d at 82 (concluding that the supervising
employee was legally justified in terminating the plaintiff because he acted
within the scope of his employment), with Finley, 79 F.3d at 1295 (finding that
the defendant-employee is a third party to a contract under a tortious interfer-
ence claim when he exceeds the scope of his employment).
80. See cases cited supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81. 838 S.W.2d at 82.
82. These factors are (a) the nature of the actor's conduct; (b) the actor's
motive; (c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes;
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor; (e) the social interests in
protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of
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was justified, or whether the defendant was privileged in act-
ing;83 other courts simply look at a defendant's motive.84 As
comment b to section 767 states, the focus on whether the de-
fendant was privileged is not necessarily misplaced. A tradi-
tional privilege-such as the manager's privilege-can play a
role in the balancing test suggested by section 767,85 especially
under factors (d) and (e), which concern the interests of the de-
fendant party and the social interests in protecting his freedom
to act.86 The manager's privilege has long been recognized as
necessary to give corporations the same rights under contract
law as individuals.87 Even in those jurisdictions that favor a
manager's privilege, however, the privilege cannot be absolute
in this context if the managerial employees are not advancing
the corporation's interest.88 The courts do not always clarify,
however, whether the manager's privilege defeats the claim be-
cause he is not a third party to the contract, as required by the
second element of a tortuous interference claim, or because the
interference is not improper, as mandated by the fourth ele-
ment.89
Thus, a dismissed at-will plaintiff must establish three
critical factors to present a proper tortious interference claim:
that the employment relationship was valid and subsisting
(even if not a legally enforceable contract), that the interfering
defendant was not a party to the relationship, and that the in-
terference was improper.
C. AGENCY LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The employer-employee relationship is described under
the other; () the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interfer-
ence; and (g) the relations between the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 767 (1977).
83. Long, Disconnect, supra note 22, at 510-11.
84. Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., 802 F. Supp. 956, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (find-
ing that employees who act on personal motives can "improperly" interfere
with an employment contract).
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1977).
86. See supra note 82.
87. See supra notes 22, 67 and accompanying text. Because a corporation
can only act through its agents, managers-as the agents of corporations-
would be hindered in carrying out their duties. Nordling v. N. States Power
Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (MAinn. 1991).
88. E.g., Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 606 (Or. 1968) (noting that
it is possible for an officer to exceed his privilege).
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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agency law as one between master and servant.90 "A master is
a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his af-
fairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical
conduct of the [agent] in the performance of the service. A ser-
vant is an agent employed by a master."91 The rules that gen-
erally govern principals and agents are applicable to the mas-
ter-servant relationship. 92
A corporate employer can act only through its employees
because the corporation is not an entity capable of its own ac-
tions; it is a legal fiction.9 3 The corporation has the legal power
to be bound contractually94 and to be held liable under tort
law,95 but it is incapable of directly performing any actions to
either end.9 6 Thus, the corporation acts through its supervisors
and managers. Managers and supervisors are agents of the
corporation.97 If this were not the case, a corporation would
evade responsibility and liability for actions taken on its be-
half.98 Indeed the entire theory of respondeat superior is based
upon this concept. 99
90. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957). The
tentative draft for the Restatement (Third) eliminates this archaic description
of master and servant; it replaces all references to master and servant in this
context with employer and employee. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
(Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 14,2001).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957).
92. Id. § 25.
93. Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 389
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 223-24
(1869), as quoted in FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 82 (1993)) ("A corporation is an imaginary be-
ing.... [I]t has no hands with which to act but the hands of its servants.");
Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("A corporation
acts through its agents.").
94. The Planter's Bank of Miss. v. Sharp, 47 U.S. 301, 322 (1848) ("[A]
corporation ... has the implied power to make contracts .... ").
95. Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415, 420 (1880) (noting that a corpora-
tion may be liable for its malicious and negligent torts).
96. Halvorsen, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389.
97. Employees, including corporate officers, are servants within the mean-
ing of agency doctrine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. c (1957).
98. See id. § 219 cmt. a ("[W]ith the growth of large enterprises, it became
increasingly apparent that it would be unjust to permit an employer to gain
from [the success of its employees] without being responsible for the mistakes,
the errors of judgment and the frailties of those working under his direction
and for his benefit."); cf. Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208
(D.R.I. 1998) (holding an employer liable for an employee's conduct is based on
sound social and economic reasons, in part because of the employer's control
over the employee's conduct).
99. The respondeat superior doctrine, see infra note 103, is "fundamental
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The analysis of principal and agent liability proceeds dif-
ferently under contract law and tort law.100 Employee-agents
can bind an employer to a contract and can carry out contrac-
tual obligations for the employer, but they are not considered
bound by the contract. 101 The principal is liable for contractual
obligations, but the agent is not. l0 2
Liability of principals and agents under tort law is not so
definitive. With regard to principal tort liability, since as early
as Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. v. Derby,10 3 states
have followed a respondeat superior doctrine. Some states es-
tablished the theory through common law,1°4 while others have
codified it in statutes. 10 5 The doctrine of respondeat superior
to the operation of the tort system in the United States." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 14, 2001). Be-
cause the employer has the right to control the work carried out on its behalf
by its employees, it follows that the liability for such acts should be born by
the employer. See id.
100. Alexander v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 614, 624 & n.13 (E.D.
Mich. 1999). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 320-332 (1957)
(discussing the tort theory of principal and agent liability), with id. §§ 218-249
(discussing the contract theory of principal and agent liability).
101. See McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 363 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding
that a corporate officer is not an individual party to a contract signed in his
capacity as agent of the corporate principal); Alexander, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 624
(quoting precedent that does not hold an agent liable for the contracts made on
the disclosed principal's behalf); Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Mgmt., Inc., 595
N.W.2d 476, 480 (Iowa 1999) (concluding that a manager had no liability to an
employee under contract theory); Hirsovescu v. Shangri-La Corp., 831 P.2d 73,
74 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320
("Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract
with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the
contract.")).
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1957).
103. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 485 (1852) (establishing that 'respondeat su-
perior,' which, by legal imputation, makes the master liable for the acts of his
servant, is wholly irrespective of any [relationship] between the injured party
and the master").
104. E.g., Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) (apply-
ing respondeat superior to any conduct within the scope of employment, even
that which is against direct orders); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d
1343, 1351 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that an employer is liable for the wrongful
acts of its employees conducted within the scope of employment even if the
employee's motive is self-interested).
105. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2338 (West 1999) (declaring the principal re-
sponsible to third parties for the negligence, wrongful acts, and willful omis-
sions of the agent); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-60 (2000) (stating that a principal
will be liable for the "neglect and fraud" of his agent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-
10-602 (2001) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-03-09 (1989) (same, with certain
exclusions specified); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-6-9 (Michie 2000) (same as
Georgia and Montana).
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clearly holds the principal liable for an agent's torts while the
agent is acting within the scope of his employment as the
agent. 0 6 The liability might not attach to the employer, or
could be limited, if the employee is not acting within the scope
of employment.10 7 The Restatement (Second) of Agency sets out
a variety of factors to determine whether an employee-agent
was acting within the scope of his employment.108 Most courts
follow the Restatement when conducting scope of employment
tests. 0
9
Liability may attach to the employer when the agent acts
with a dual purpose, such as serving his own interests as well
as his master's, provided the act is still within the agent's scope
106. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957) (hold-
ing a master liable "for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment," but not generally for those committed "outside the
scope of their employment").
107. See id. § 219(2).
108. These factors include, inter alia, whether the conduct is of the sort the
agent is employed to perform, whether the conduct occurs within the author-
ized time and location of the agent's employment, whether it is conducted to
serve the principal, whether the act is commonly done by other similar agents,
and whether the principal should reasonably expect the conduct. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-229 (1957).
109. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring
that a defendant-employee exceed the bounds of her authority to be considered
a third party for an interference claim); Nelson v. Fleet Natl Bank, 949 F.
Supp. 254, 263-64 (D. Del. 1996) (relying on the Restatement (Second) of
Agency to decide whether an employee acted outside the scope of his employ-
ment for the purposes of allowing a tortious interference with contract claim to
proceed); Richards v. O'Neil, 2000 WL 640314, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (not-
ing that an agent who does not act "legitimately" may be liable under an inter-
ference claim); Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn.
1991) (recognizing that "a corporate officer or agent may be liable for tortious
contract interference if he or she acts outside the scope of his or her duties").
A similar approach is used to determine employer liability in Title VII sexual
harassment claims. The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, instructed "courts to look to agency principles for guidance" in deter-
mining employer liability for such sexual harassment claims, while also cau-
tioning that the "common-law principles may not be [completely] transfer-
able." 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court clarified how agency principles are
and are not transferable in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775
(1998), and its companion case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998). The Court modified the scope of employment test by creating a
"tangible employment action" threshold test to ensure employer liability when
a harassing supervisor or manager took such an adverse action against the
plaintiff and provided the employer an affirmative defense if the harasser took
no tangible employment action. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington Indus.,
524 U.S. at 760-63. Examples of tangible employment actions include termi-
nations, demotions, or formal disciplinary actions. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
2002] THE THREE FACES OF EVE 1559
of employment. 110 In the employment context, a supervisor
with the power to fire an employee can act within his scope of
employment when carrying out a termination, even if his mo-
tives are tainted with personal reasons or not authorized ex-
plicitly by the employer.Il' To determine whether an employee
was acting within the scope of his employment for the purposes
of holding the employer liable, courts will ask when the act took
place, where it took place, and whether it was foreseeable.1 1 2
Courts also look to the actor's motivations. 113 In Zimmerman,
the First Circuit noted that the motivation behind the act, even
within the logistic bounds of employment, could be dispositive
when determining liability."14
Holding a principal liable for the tortious conduct of its
agent does not relieve the agent from personal responsibility
for such actions.115 Employees remain liable for their own
torts, regardless of whether liability attaches to their em-
ployer. 116 Thus, an employee is always responsible for his in-
tentional torts, whether or not he is acting outside the scope of
110. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351 (4th Cir. 1995)
(confirming that an employer may be liable for an employee's acts even when
the employee acts for his own interests).
111. See Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying
respondeat superior to any conduct by the employee so long as it was within
the scope of employment, even if it was contrary to express orders); Martin, 48
F.3d at 1351 ("[Ain employer may be liable for its employee's unauthorized use
of force if such use was foreseeable in view of the employee's duties.").
112. See Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 78 (1st Cir.
2001); Lyons v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605, 609 (1st Cir. 1998) (following criteria set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine the scope of em-
ployment); Martin, 48 F.3d at 1351; Nelson, 949 F. Supp. at 263; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (1957); cf Rodriguez, 129 F.3d at
767-68; Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 506.
113. Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 76; Lyons, 158 F.3d at 610; Nordling, 478
N.W.2d at 506 ("While motive or malice is only one factor to consider... [in a
scope of employment determination], it can be the critical factor.").
114. 262 F.3d at 77 ("Since '[tihere is no practical difference.., between
'actual malice' and improper motives and means for the purposes of [tortious
interference], proven retaliation may serve as a proxy for actual malice.'") (al-
teration in original) (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.R.I.
1998) (concluding that respondeat superior liability does not remove liability
from the employee-wrongdoer); see also Sit-Set, A.G. v. Universal Jet Exch.,
Inc., 747 F.2d 921, 929 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Corporate officers may of course be
liable jointly and severally with their corporation for obligations arising out of
tortious conduct of the officers ... ."), quoted in Shivvers v. Hertz Farm
Mgmt., Inc., 595 N.W.2d 476,480-81 (Iowa 1999).
116. See generally RESTATEAIENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1957).
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employment. 117
Courts will also use the agency approach to determine if a
supervisor or manager was acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment and therefore acting as a third party subject to liabil-
ity for tortious interference claims.118 Some of these decisions
merge the analysis of improper interference under the tort
claim, which requires that a defendant improperly interfere
with a contract, with the analysis of improper actions under the
agency law scope of employment test.119 Under the scope of em-
ployment test, an agent acting improperly could be acting out-
side his employment scope.120 For example, in Zimmerman, the
court discussed the supervisor-defendant's improper actions to
determine whether he acted outside the scope of his employ-
ment-not whether those actions were improper interfer-
ence. 121 Even cases that purport to block an interference claim
against a supervising employee acknowledge that the primary
reason the employee is shielded is because he is acting within
the scope of his employment. 122
The agency scope of employment test determines whether
an employer-principal will be held liable for an employee-
agent's torts. A plaintiff can satisfy the tort requirement that a
defendant be a third party to a contract by applying these
agency principles in reverse-to determine whether a supervi-
sor-defendant in a tortious interference claim was acting out-
side the scope of employment. 123 She may also meet her burden
under the improper interference element of the tortious inter-
ference claim with this same showing.124
Although courts do not agree about the validity of an at-
will relationship for the purposes of contract enforcement, they
nonetheless look to contract principles in at-will employment
claims. 125 Likewise, although courts are not consistent in their
approach to tortious interference claims in the at-will context,
117. Wyss, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
118. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. These cases use the tort
aspect of liability under agency law, as opposed to the contract aspect dis-
cussed supra note 101.
119 See, e.g., Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 75-78.
120. See id. at 76.
121. See id.
122. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 77.
125. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1560 [Vol.86:1541
THE THREE FACES OF EVE
they are united in recognizing three important elements of any
such claim: a valid and existing contract, a third-party defen-
dant, and conduct amounting to improper interference. 126 Fi-
nally, agency law provides a test for determining the scope of
an agent's employment. Primarily used to determine employer
liability for agent conduct, this test is sometimes used to decide
whether a supervisor is a third party in a tortious interference
claim. 127 Conscientiously applying all three of these legal doc-
trines leads to a consistent treatment of tortious interference
claims in the at-will setting.
II. CONNECTING THE DISCONNECT: THREE FACES ARE
BETTER THAN ONE
To understand how these three bodies of law intersect,
consider three hypothetical situations. Assume that in each
circumstance, the plaintiff is an at-will employee. Next, as-
sume the supervisor-defendant has malice toward the plaintiff-
employee. Each plaintiff, dismissed for poor performance by a
supervisor who did not like her,128 probably generates sympa-
thy, but the culpability of each supervisor-defendant varies
with the methods each uses to terminate the employment.
In scenario one, the supervisor acts abusively toward the
plaintiff, publicly humiliating the employee in her work area
and during company meetings.1 29 The supervisor excludes the
employee from training meetings, increasing the difficulty she
will face meeting minimum productivity standards. When the
employee makes mistakes, the supervisor reprimands her ag-
gressively. The supervisor berates the employee on a daily ba-
sis, culminating in a heated argument that results in the em-
ployee's termination.
Scenario two involves a supervisor whose job is to conduct
routine evaluations of employee productivity. The evaluations
are to be based on objective criteria such as attendance, on-time
arrival records, and quantitative production goals. Although
the employer generally uses these evaluations to determine in-
126. See discussion supra Part I.B.
127. See cases cited supra note 72.
128. Ignore potential claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits terminating an employee on the basis of five protected classes, in-
cluding sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
129. Recall the facts of Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 73-74 (describing the de-
fendant's hostile treatment of the plaintiff after she announced she was preg-
nant).
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dividual employee merit wage increases and for disciplinary
purposes, there is no express or implied promise to the employ-
ees that the employer will only make such decisions for cause.
Therefore, the employment relationship remains at-will. The
supervisor falsifies the specific employee output records to
make it appear that the employee is not meeting her production
quotas. The employee receives poor evaluations that eventu-
ally lead to her dismissal.
Scenario three involves a sales team supervisor who has
unlimited discretion to assign sales territories to sales employ-
ees. The supervisor dislikes a certain employee and consis-
tently assigns her the hardest territories, thereby increasing
the chances that the sales employee will fail to perform ade-
quately. When the salesperson is ultimately dismissed for fail-
ure to meet company-established sales goals, she sues her su-
pervisor, claiming that the poor assignments improperly
interfered with her employment relationship.
Taking each hypothetical in turn, the next section will ex-
plore how the different jurisdictions would approach each sce-
nario, illustrating the problems with the inconsistencies among
the various approaches.
A. CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENCY
The first obstacle our plaintiff in scenario one faces is
whether the at-will relationship is even capable of being inter-
fered with: Is the at-will employment relationship a valid con-
tract, or at least, as it is classified in certain states like New
Jersey,130 a prospective business (or contractual) relationship?
If the plaintiff sues in Nevada, Illinois, or Hawaii, she will not
even get through the courtroom door because those states do
not recognize an interference claim in the at-will employment
setting.131
If she makes it into court, our plaintiff still faces ambigu-
ity. Will the supervisor be considered a third party with re-
spect to the plaintiffs contract (or business relationship) with
her employer? If this scenario occurs in California, Missouri, or
Florida, 132 the plaintiff will lose because these jurisdictions will
130. Varrallo v. Hammond Inc., 94 F.3d 842, 848 (3d Cir. 1996).
131. Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993);
Hicks v. Clyde Fed. Sav. & Loan, 696 F. Supp. 387, 389 (N.D. IM. 1988); cf.
Francis v. Lee Enter., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 717 (1999) (refusing to recognize tor-
tious breach of contract actions in an employment setting).
132. See cases cited supra note 67.
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not consider a supervisor-defendant an outsider, 133 even if the
supervisor acted with malice. For example, in California, al-
though an at-will employment contract is valid for the purpose
of a tortious interference claim, the supervisor has an absolute
privilege and his "state of mind is irrelevant."1 34 In Oregon, the
plaintiff must show that the supervisor exceeded his authority
before a court will consider whether he acted with malice. 135 If
the scenario occurs in jurisdictions that follow an agency scope
of employment test,136 the malice allegation may enhance the
plaintiffs claim that the supervisor exceeded his scope of
employment. 37 The plaintiff has the best chance to succeed in
the states that blur the lines between the third party and
improper interference requirements. 138
None of the jurisdictions provide a predictable outcome as
to whether this supervisor's actions-namely, humiliating the
plaintiff and hindering her ability to succeed at work-exceed
the bounds of his authority, place him outside the scope of his
employment, or render his actions toward the plaintiff im-
proper. Yet, in most cases, the courts will inquire into the su-
pervisor's state of mind, despite the fact that at-will employers
are generally free from such inquiries. 139
The second scenario also reveals inconsistency. This plain-
tiff faces the same initial hurdle the first plaintiff faced regard-
ing the recognition of her at-will status as an enforceable con-
tract for the purposes of the tortious interference claim. 140
Assuming she crosses that hurdle successfully, this plaintiff
has a more tangible allegation against her supervisor-the fal-
sification of records. While the allegation may be clearer in
this scenario, the treatment from the various jurisdictions is
not: A fraudulent act could destroy any protection the supervi-
133. See cases cited supra note 67.
134. Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 390
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
135. A showing of malice is relevant only to prove improper purpose.
McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 847 (Or. 1995) (requiring that the
third-party element must be satisfied before any inquiry takes place regarding
improper motive).
136. Examples of jurisdictions using the scope of employment test include
New York, Washington, D.C., Iowa, Minnesota, Arizona, and Connecticut. See
cases cited supra note 72.
137. See cases cited supra note 113.
138. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
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sor might enjoy in those states that follow an agency test, but it
might not in the other states. 141 Arguably, where the man-
ager's privilege is absolute, the plaintiff has no relief despite
the clearly fraudulent actions of the supervisor-defendant. 142
Where the courts consider the acts of the defendants for both
the improper interference element and the third-party defen-
dant element, this plaintiff will likely succeed. 143
The third hypothetical plaintiff will again face the initial
challenge of asserting that her at-will employment relationship
is a valid and enforceable contract for the purposes of the tor-
tious interference claim, and she will fail in those jurisdictions
that have an absolute manager's privilege. This supervisor has
acted with malice, but has hardly demonstrated behavior that
is outside the scope of his employment, nor improper in that
context."14 Yet this plaintiff may have success in the jurisdic-
tions that merge the elements and allow malice to suffice for
both an improper interference showing and a third-party de-
fendant showing. 145 If the jurisdiction allows a showing of mal-
ice under the scope of employment test, she may also suc-
ceed.146 The plaintiff is likely to fail in those jurisdictions that
will not consider malice for the third-party element because the
supervisor in this scenario did not act out of bounds.
As these hypothetical situations demonstrate, the plaintiffs
will succeed or fail because of the jurisdictions' approach to the
tortious interference claim, and not because of the supervisors'
conduct. Even where a supervisor committed fraud to ensure
141. See supra Part I.B, C for a discussion regarding whether an employer
is liable for its employee's torts. If the employer is liable for the supervisor's
fraudulent act, it seems to follow that the supervisor would not be considered
a third party. However, as the discussion in Part I.B and C indicates, courts
do not always agree.
142. See Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 390
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998). But cf Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 606 (Or.
1968) (noting that it is possible for an officer to exceed his privilege).
143. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
144. The supervisor here is authorized to assign sales territories at his dis-
cretion. No facts exist to conclude that his actions exceeded his bounds of au-
thority. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (inter-
preting the scope of employment test to require that a supervisor-defendant's
conduct must exceed the bounds of his authority to treat him as a third party).
145. See Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.
2001); Lyons v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605, 610 (1st Cir. 1998).
146. See Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn.
1991) ("While motive or malice is only one factor to consider... [in a scope of
employment determination], it can be the critical factor.").
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the plaintiffs termination in the second scenario, the plaintiff
may not prevail. Conversely, the plaintiff in scenario three
could win in certain states even though her supervisor's actions
were well within his authority.
B. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF SEEING THREE FACES AT ONCE
Despite the universal conclusion that the employment rela-
tionship is best analyzed under contract principles, 147 inconsis-
tency remains among the jurisdictions as to the enforceability
of an at-will relationship. 148 The policy justifications for the at-
will presumption 149 tip the scales toward viewing the relation-
ship as one that does not consist of a valid and enforceable con-
tract, because an at-will relationship will lose flexibility if an
enforceable contract exists. Indeed, the fact that courts and
legislatures have developed many exceptions to the at-will rule
to find an enforceable contract reflects this view. 150
On the other hand, perhaps the judicial and legislative ef-
forts to find public policy exceptions to the at-will relationship
reflect a growing consensus that even though society still favors
the idea of employer and employee freedom embodied in the at-
will rule, bad bosses need to be reined in.151 Although courts
support the presumption of at-will employment generally, be-
cause it logically flows from the long-standing and widely ac-
cepted basic economic philosophy of ensuring that employers
and employees have the freedom to contract, 152 factually spe-
cific circumstances--especially situations where employers
acted egregiously when firing an employee-will often move
courts to find an exception to the employment-at-will presump-
147. Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Nev. 1993)
("Theoretically, employment-at-will is a contractual relationship governed by
contract law."); RoTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, § 1.27.
148. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
149. The at-will rule is generally favored to give employers and employees
the freedom to enter and exit employment relationships and the flexibility to
respond to market changes. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
150. See supra Part I-A regarding the development of public policy and
handbook exceptions to the at-will rule.
151. Cf. Long, Disconnect, supra note 22, at 491 (discussing Pauline T.
Kim's survey of more than three hundred unemployed people in Bargaining
with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection
in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133-34 (1997), which found that
almost ninety percent of the respondents believed that a supervisor could not
legally fire an at-will employee because of personal dislike).
152. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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tion.153 Courts will allow a plaintiff to recover for a discharge
that violates public policy even when the employment is at-
will. 154 Thus, decisions that recognize the at-will relationship
as an enforceable contract enjoying protection from outside in-
terference seem to strike the appropriate balance between the
competing policies of protecting employees from abusive deci-
sions and preserving employers' freedom to manage their busi-
nesses as they choose.
Outside the employment setting, at-will contracts receive
protection under both contract law and tort law. 155 It follows
that at-will contracts in the employment setting should also get
protection from outsiders. The question therefore becomes who
is an outsider for the purposes of an at-will tortious interfer-
ence claim.
Although there are a variety of approaches to a tortious in-
terference claim in the employment setting, 156 with no consis-
tent outcome in the application of these approaches, 157 the
practical effect of these varying approaches may be a distinc-
tion without a difference. The Restatement (Second) of Agency
suggests an examination of the actor's motive to determine
whether he is indeed acting outside the scope of his relation-
ship with the principal, 158 and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts suggests an inquiry into motive to determine whether the
153. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 78 (1st Cir.
2001); Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1984).
154. See, e.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn.
1987) (concluding that an at-will employee had a claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977).
156. See supra Part L.A-C.
157. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
158. See discussion supra Part I.C. The Restatement (Second) of Agency
suggests that malice can be a factor in determining whether a supervisor acted
outside the scope of his employment. Malice, however, may not be sufficient to
take a defendant outside the scope of his employment. Compare Rodriguez v.
Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying respondeat superior to
any conduct within the scope of employment, even that which is against direct
orders), and Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351 (4th Cir. 1995)
(noting that an employer is liable for the wrongful acts of its employees con-
ducted within the scope of employment even if the employee's motive is self-
interested), with Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (in-
structing "courts to look to agency principles for guidance" in determining em-
ployer liability for such sexual harassment claims, while also cautioning that
the "common-law principles may not be [completely] transferable"). The prac-
tical effect of these cases sets a high threshold to place a supervisor-defendant
outside the scope of his employment.
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interference was improper. 159 Thus, the defendant's motive is
likely to be a critical part of a plaintiff's prima facie case (either
to meet her burden under the second element, which requires a
third-party defendant, or the fourth element, requiring im-
proper interference from this third-party defendant) in the at-
will setting when the plaintiff is suing her former supervisor.
A successful plaintiff must show that the supervising em-
ployee acted outside the scope of employment and should thus
be considered a third party.160 While certain types of unauthor-
ized wrongful conduct will not place the employee outside the
scope of employment to establish employer liability, 16 1 there is
at least a theoretical line that an agent-employee can cross,
even in those jurisdictions that have not allowed tortious inter-
ference claims against supervisors. 162 Because wrongful con-
duct alone does not necessarily put an agent-employee outside
the scope of his employment, courts usually look to motive to
determine if the agent-employee has crossed that theoretical
line.163
To satisfy the improper interference element, the plaintiff
must also show that the supervising employee's interfering
conduct was improper16 One factor to consider in this analy-
sis is the motive of the actor.165 If the plaintiff has already
demonstrated improper conduct (with or without a showing of
malice) to meet the higher threshold set by the scope of em-
ployment test,166 she is likely to prevail on the interference
element as well.167 Scenario two is a good illustration of this
159. See discussion supra Part I.B. An inquiry into motive is permissible
but not necessary. A supervisor is generally empowered to fire an at-will em-
ployee on behalf of the employer-that is, firing is within the scope of his em-
ployment. The nature of an at-will employment relationship necessarily
means that any or no reason is needed to terminate the employment (making
the tests for exceeding the scope of employment and determining improper in-
terference difficult to meet). The practical effect of applying both Restatement
tests (Agency and then Torts) is to set a higher threshold to satisfy the agency
prong than to satisfy the tortious interference prong.
160. See discussion supra Part I.B, C.
161. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
163. See Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn.
1991).
164. See discussion supra Part I.B.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).
166. See supra note 159.
167. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 77-78 (1st Cir.
2001) (noting that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant's "Me-
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point: The supervisor falsified records in order to terminate the
plaintiffs employment. Such conduct would easily be deemed
improper with or without a motive showing.168
Even when motive is not the gravamen of the plaintiffs
case, it is difficult to invent a situation where a defendant's
conduct is sufficiently improper to place him outside the scope
of his employment but not improper enough to satisfy the inter-
ference element. In the third scenario, the supervisor's action
may not seem sufficiently improper to satisfy either element,
with or without a showing of malice. Conversely, the supervi-
sor in the first scenario demonstrates enough malice to place
him outside the scope of his employment even if his actions are
arguably within the scope (and perhaps not improper). Such
abuse may, however, generate a finding that his behavior was
improper if the abuse was significant enough to place the su-
pervisor outside the scope of his employment.169 Indeed, most
courts blur this analysis when the plaintiff has shown the con-
duct was outside the scope of employment. 170 Even if the plain-
tiff is not successful in placing the supervisor outside the scope
of his employment, it is theoretically possible that the improper
interference element will still be met with a showing of mal-
ice. 171 When the plaintiff has not met her burden under the
third-party element, however, most courts never reach the im-
proper interference element. 172 Under such circumstances, the
plaintiff in scenario one would not prevail.
Where at-will status does not prevent a plaintiff from
bringing her tortious interference claim, supervisor-defendants
will be exposed to state-of-mind inquiries, whether to place
them outside the employment relationship as third parties, to
assess their actions as improper, or some combination of the
gitimate" motive was sufficient to take him outside his scope of employment
and to support an inference that his interference with the plaintiffs employ-
ment was improper).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (1977) (noting that
fraud is wrongful even if the actor was authorized to "accomplish the same re-
sult by more suitable means").
169. Cf Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 78.
170. See supra note 72.
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. d (1977) (stating
that while motive may not be sufficient to meet the improper interference
element, in some circumstances it could be enough, when "a desire to inter-
fere... [is] the sole motive").
172. See supra note 67.
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3
C. JOINING THE FACES: AGENCY LAW PROVIDES HARMONY
Critics of the blurring analysis employed by some courts174
ignore agency principles with respect to employers and employ-
ees. 175 This "freedom to interfere" is based upon an analysis of
the tortious interference claim under the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. 176 But as the Restatement suggests, until the actual
parties terminate the at-will agreement, a third-party defen-
dant may not improperly interfere with the contract. 177 This
suggestion applies to all tortious interference claims, not just
those in the employment-at-will setting.178 To apply this prin-
ciple to the employment setting without a consideration of
agency law ignores the "intriguing turn" such a tort claim takes
in the employment context. 179
The unique relationship between employer-principals and
their employee-agents requires an analysis that incorporates
contract, agency, and tort law. Because of the preference for
holding employers liable through respondeat superior princi-
ples, 180 the threshold requirement of improper conduct that
places a defendant outside the scope of employment is necessar-
ily higher than the tortious interference requirement that the
third-party defendant's interference be improper. 181  This
173. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
174. See discussion supra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing how some jurisdictions merge the analysis of the elements of the third-
party requirement and the improper actions of the third party).
175. See Long, Disconnect, supra note 22, at 525. Long argues that because
the contract being interfered with is an at-will contract, deserving less protec-
tion, it necessarily follows that defendants have greater latitude within which
to interfere. See id. Allowing an inquiry into a defendant's motive without a
recognition of the rights of at-will employers to dismiss employees without re-
gard to motive erodes the at-will benefits to employers. See id.
176. Id. (discussing the distinction in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
between tortious interference with contract actions and tortious interference
with business relations actions).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1977). It is certainly
true that an at-will contract is relevant to determine damages, in the employ-
ment setting or otherwise. Id. § 767 cmt. e.
178. Id. § 766 cmt. g.
179. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.
2001).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1957) (noting
that it would be "unjust" to allow an employer to benefit from its employees'
actions but not to take responsibility for such actions).
181. See supra notes 158-159.
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higher threshold protects the benefits of at-will employment
while providing plaintiffs an opportunity for redress. For ex-
ample, a malicious supervisor, such as the one described in the
first scenario, who harasses or humiliates an employee would
be acting outside the scope of employment because it is unlikely
that his employer has authorized him to act in such a way. 8 2
On the other hand, a supervisor who reasonably terminates an
employee, but also dislikes the employee (a bad motive), would
not be considered to have acted outside the scope of employ-
ment. 183
The criticism of judicial inconsistency in tortious interfer-
ence claims in the at-will setting 8 4 does have some merit, al-
beit on a different basis. Courts that do not explicitly apply an
agency analysis to the third-party element are not acknowledg-
ing the unique place that employment cases occupy. 8 5 Agency
law is crucial to understanding the relationship between the
employer and the supervisor-defendant in a tort claim. With-
out this understanding, courts rely only on basic contract and
tort liability theories and are inconsistent in holding-or refus-
ing to hold- such defendants liable.18 6 When trying to harmo-
nize the apparent inconsistencies, confusion occurs when de-
termining whether an improper motive was dispositive for the
third-party defendant element or the improper interference
element. 8 7
Blurred reasoning 88 does not help courts hearing such
claims, employers seeking to avoid such claims, or employees
seeking relief. When a court decides that a claim cannot pro-
ceed, but does not clarify whether the claim failed because the
defendant was acting within the scope of employment or be-
cause the conduct was not improper, plaintiffs and future
182. Accord Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 78; see also Nelson v. Fleet Nat'l
Bank, 949 F. Supp. 254, 263 (D. Del. 1996) (recognizing that acts such as as-
sault and battery do not fall within the scope of employment).
183. Accord Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(concluding that when an employer can terminate an at-will employee without
cause, a supervisor can lawfully carry out such a termination).
184. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
185. See Zimmerman, 262 F.3d at 76 (discussing the "paradox" of the tor-
tious interference claim in the employment context).
186. See supra notes 63-89 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 77, 84 and accompanying text.
188. As the Oregon Supreme Court noted in McGanty v. Staudenraus, none
of the controlling cases in that jurisdiction provided guidance for resolving the
issue of the third-party element of the tortious interference claim. 901 P.2d
841, 847 (Or. 1995).
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courts lack guidance for framing such claims, and employers
lack clarity for defending against the claims. Moreover, by ig-
noring agency theory, courts further confuse would-be plaintiffs
and employers because an understanding of agency liability can
reduce the confusion inherent in a tortious interference
claim.1s9
Thus, although courts will inquire into the motive of a de-
fendant to determine whether he was acting within the scope of
his employment and whether his conduct was improper, when
courts do not identify the purpose for which they are making
the inquiry, the result is confusing and unhelpful.
III. AGENCY LAW AS THE CONNECTING PIN
A. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-IMPROPER INTERFERENCE TWO-
STEP
Tortious interference in the employment-at-will setting can
be confusing at first glance. As at-will employment seems to
imply an unbreachable contract between employer and em-
ployee, common sense seems to dictate that an employer's
managers and supervisors cannot interfere with the employer's
relationship with other employees. Nevertheless, in seeming
disregard for common sense, courts allow such claims to pro-
ceed.' 90 Adding to the confusion, courts often fail to provide
thorough analyses when concluding that such claims are
proper.19' If courts would recognize and clearly adopt estab-
lished principles of agency law, they would bring tortious inter-
ference claims in accord with common sense and with other
theories of employer liability.192
The first common sense objection to a tortious interference
claim reflects the general acceptance and understanding of the
at-will employment rule: It gives the employer the right to ter-
minate the employee's employment with or without a reason.
189. See supra Part I.B-C for an explanation of tort liability theories with
respect to employment relationships.
190. See supra Part I.B.
191. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
192. Acknowledging the notion of fairness that holds an employer liable for
an employee's tortious conduct under respondeat superior theory, which also
provides that an employer should not be liable when the employee acts outside
the scope of employment, it follows that the employee should remain individu-
ally liable for his torts. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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The at-will rule recognizes the employer's legitimate interest to
control its business, including its employees. 193 The consensus
is that the rule provides employers with the flexibility they
need to run their businesses most efficiently.194 How, then, can
such an open arrangement be subject to interference? While
protecting the theoretical basis for the at-will rule, courts have
consistently recognized certain exceptions that grant a dis-
charged employee relief. For example, when the behavior of a
specific employer offends public policy, courts will allow a
wrongful discharge action to proceed, even in an at-will rela-
tionship.1 95 The growing concern to protect employees from
abusive employers has included a growth in the number of tor-
tious interference claims on behalf of aggrieved plaintiffs.196
The courts' acceptance of tortious interference claims follows
logically from their acceptance of wrongful discharges under
the public policy exceptions-if the courts protect employees
from being terminated for whistle-blowing or filing a workers
compensation claim, 197 it is not difficult to understand why they
would want to protect employees from abusive treatment, or at
least from the most vicious instances thereof. Thus this first
common sense objection is easily answered.
The second, and more troubling, objection-the question of
how a supervisor can interfere with an employee's employ-
ment-has not been sufficiently addressed by courts that have
allowed tortious interference claims to proceed. 98 The incon-
sistent approach of courts to the third-party element 99 has not
provided employers with the predictability they need to operate
a business within their rights, nor has it provided guidance for
aggrieved plaintiffs.20° In order to balance employer and em-
ployee interests, courts must clarify when and why a tortious
interference claim can proceed.201 If employers understand the
193. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-76 (1908), overruled in part
by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); see also Long, Discon-
nect, supra note 22, at 517-19.
194. See Long, Disconnect, supra note 22, at 518.
195. See discussion supra Part I.A.
196. See Long, White Meat, supra note 28, at 865-66.
197. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
198. See discussion supra Part I.B.
199. See Long, Disconnect, supra note 22, at 511-12 (providing a categorical
summary of courts' various approaches to the third-party status of supervi-
sors).
200. See discussion supra Part II.B.
201. See, e.g., Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn.
1572 [Vol.86:1541
THE THREE FACES OF EVE
liability principles to which they are subject, they can better
control the actions of their supervisors while still exercising
control over their employees. Likewise, when the types of con-
duct that can lead to employer liability are clear, plaintiffs will
be able to gain relief from truly egregious treatment20 2 and will
be deterred from pursuing frivolous claims
2 0 3
The ability to overcome this confusion lies in the connec-
tion between agency law and tort law. Because tort law per-
vades other areas of law,2°4 and agency law covers the non-
contractual relationship of employers and employees,205 courts
should adopt an approach to tortious interference claims that
explicitly incorporates both bodies of law.
Agency law respects both the employer's right to control its
employees and the at-will employment doctrine. 20 6 Thus, appli-
cation of the principles of agency law to the third-party analysis
should address the fears of critics who view successful tortious
interference claims as erosions of the at-will doctrine.20 7 These
critics recognize that an inquiry into a supervisor's motives is
de facto an inquiry into an employer's motives, and they justly
argue that the at-will rule should protect an employer from
such an inquiry.208 However, when a court applies the scope of
employment test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, not only the motives but the conduct of the defendant
will be examined.20 9 Borrowing further from the Supreme
Court's modification of the scope of employment test in
Faragher210 and Ellerth,211 the supervisor-defendant cannot be
1991) (acknowledging sound policy reasons to shield agents from liability for
actions taken on behalf of their employers, while also recognizing that there
may be compelling exceptions that should expose those agents to liability).
202. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 78 (1st Cir.
2001) (finding the defendant's "interference sank to depths more peccant than
mere slights").
203. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that the facts of the case provide "adequate justification for the termi-
nation of [the] plaintiff if evidence ofjustification is in fact required").
204. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1957).
206. Id. §§ 1, 2, 20-25 (discussing the control exercised by the principal,
and the freedom under some circumstances of the agents, and determining
that in many contexts, the relation between master and servant is the same).
207. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
208. The at-will presumption implicitly acknowledges that if an employer
can fire for any or no reason, then its reason to fire is irrelevant.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-229 (1957).
210. 524 U.S. 775 (1998); see supra note 109.
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outside the scope of his employment if his only conduct was
taking an adverse tangible employment action such as a demo-
tion, termination, or reprimand.212  Under Faragher and
Ellerth, the employer is liable if the supervisor's conduct in-
cluded adverse tangible employment actions. 213 The analogy
can work in reverse, so that for the purposes of the tortious in-
terference claim, a supervisor-defendant would not exceed the
scope of his employment if the only actions complained of were
adverse tangible employment actions. Malice is still a factor
under the agency scope of employment test,214 but with the
Faragher-Ellerth modification, it will not be determinative.
Moreover, a factual examination of a defendant's conduct,
rather than a state-of-mind test, should lead to more predict-
able results.215
Thus, unless a supervisor's conduct goes beyond tangible
employment actions, the employer still derives the benefits of
the at-will presumption with respect to the lack of inquiry into
its motives. Additionally, a court might never reach an inquiry
into a supervisor's (and thus an employer's) motives for either
of two reasons: (1) the supervisor-defendant's conduct may be
sufficiently outrageous to conclude he was outside the scope of
employment without ever inquiring into his motives, 216 or (2)
the conduct is sufficiently within the defendant's scope of em-
ployment that it fails to satisfy the third-party requirement of
the tort claim, regardless of the defendant's motive.217 Al-
211. 524 U.S. 742 (1998); see supra note 109.
212. Tangible employment actions were defined this way in Ellerth. 524
U.S. at 762-63. Some courts have broadened this definition in subsequent em-
ployment cases, see, e.g., Phillips v. Bowen, 2002 WL 89394, at *5 (2d Cir.
2002), but for the tortious interference claim, the rationale of Ellerth supports
a narrow construction of the modification. See Caridad v. Metro-North Com-
muter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (comparing the rationale of
Ellerth to the rationale of the Restatement (Second) of Agency scope of em-
ployment test).
213. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228, 235 (1957) (allowing con-
duct to be considered in conjunction with motive).
215. See supra Part I.B (discussing the importance of the plaintiffs care in
defining the offending actions). That caution is still necessary under this
modified test.
216. For example, the supervisor could have humiliated the plaintiff and
acted as the defendant in Zimmerman did-adversely affecting Zimmerman's
employment, but without taking tangible employment actions to do so. Zim-
merman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2001).
217. E.g., Eggleston v. Phillips, 838 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("De-
fendants may not have liked plaintiff but that does not convert her discharge
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though malice can be a critical factor in determining improper
conduct and improper interference, it carries less weight in the
scope of employment test,218 especially as modified by the ad-
verse tangible employment action requirement. 219 Thus, using
a modified scope of employment test to determine third-party
status in a tortious interference claim provides clear and con-
sistent protection of an employer's at-will rights with regard to
judicial scrutiny of motivation behind its agent's conduct. In-
deed, the use of such an agency approach by courts, whether
explicit or implicit, is an endorsement of the proposition that
the employer's interests are well-served under agency theory.220
The determination of improper interference should there-
fore proceed after it has been established that the defendant is
indeed a third party. If the defendant has demonstrated egre-
gious conduct and is considered a third party, it is unlikely that
ordinarily permissible actions under the at-will umbrella (such
as firing an employee) would be held to constitute improper in-
terference. 221 If a supervisor is authorized to evaluate, to ter-
minate, or to recommend terminations, and he carries out such
actions without egregious conduct, he remains within his scope
of employment.222 If the supervisor's only interference was a
tangible employment action, such as firing the plaintiff, or rec-
ommending that the plaintiff be fired, his conduct could not
have been improper. This approach, therefore, protects the at-
will rule by protecting the supervisor's authority to take tangi-
ble employment actions within his scope of employment.
as an employee at will into an interference [action]. To support a cause of ac-
tion for [tortuous interference in an at will setting] requires evidence eliminat-
ing any business justification .... ").
218. Malice carries less weight because as long as some motive to serve the
employer exists, a bad motive is not enough to place the employee outside his
scope of employment. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351
(4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that acting in self-interest is not enough to take
the employee outside his scope of employment).
219. See supra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
220. See discussion supra Part I.B-C. Even though courts that favor the at-
will rule are likely to find that an employee-defendant acted within the scope
of employment, they still conduct the analysis.
221. If the facts are enough to place the defendant outside his scope, then
he necessarily behaved in a manner beyond executing an adverse tangible em-
ployment action. See supra Part I.B-C; supra notes 209-215 and accompany-
ing text. Thus a court would not need to rely solely on the tangible employ-
ment action to meet the improper interference element.
222. See supra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
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B. DANCING THE TWO-STEP: APPLICATION IN PRACTICE
To understand the benefits of this approach, let us revisit
our three hypothetical scenarios.2 23 Recall that in the first sce-
nario, the supervisor acts abusively toward the plaintiff and
eventually fires her. The employee would not have any wrong-
ful discharge claim against her employer because, however
egregiously the supervisor behaved, abusive supervisors are not
included in any of the public policy exceptions allowed by
courts, unless the abuse is motivated by the plaintiffs sex, race,
or other protected status.224 If this employee filed a tortious in-
terference claim against this supervisor, under the proposed
approach, the court would first look to the supervisor's conduct
to determine whether he is a proper third party. Applying the
modified agency scope of employment test, the court would ask
whether the conduct in question was simply the implementa-
tion of an adverse tangible employment action or if it went be-
yond carrying out employment actions.
Applying the facts of the first scenario to this question
would yield a finding that the supervisor exceeded his scope of
employment: Although performance evaluations are tangible
employment actions, the other conduct goes beyond the limits
established in Ellerth.225 Preventing an employee from getting
the necessary training, publicly humiliating an employee, and
general abuse are arguably outside the definition of tangible
employment action.226
Thus, a court would be able to conclude that this supervi-
sor acted outside his scope of employment and could proceed to
analyze whether his conduct improperly interfered with the
employee's at-will contract with her employer. A court could
make these conclusions without an explicit reliance on malice,
despite the clear evidence of such a motive.
Scenario two involves a supervisor who falsified productiv-
ity reports in order to bring about the plaintiffs dismissal.227
Under the modified scope of employment test, a court would
look at the falsification of the employee's production records
and easily conclude that it could never be in the employer's in-
223. See supra Part II.A.
224. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
225. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (defining a
tangible employment action as a "significant change in employment status ...
causing a significant change in benefits").
226. See id.
227. See supra Part II.A.
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terest for supervisors to generate erroneous reports, even if the
preparation of the reports could be considered a tangible em-
ployment action as part of a disciplinary review. Falsifying re-
cords is not a tangible employment action in the manner in-
tended by the Supreme Court. 228 Additionally, a court could
look to other supervisors to see if they routinely falsified work
records to conduct evaluations. It is unlikely this would be
true. This supervisor would therefore be held a proper third
party under the agency scope of employment test. A court
would then look to the same conduct-preparing incorrect
evaluations-to assess the improper interference element of the
claim.
Scenario three involves a sales team supervisor who has
unlimited discretion to assign sales territories to the sales em-
ployees.229 Applying first the modified scope of employment
test, a court would look at the supervisor's conduct in the con-
text of his authorization from the employer. The supervisor is
empowered with discretionary authority to assign territories.
The assignment of territories is certainly a tangible employ-
ment action. Therefore, the assignment of these poor territo-
ries was within his authority, and would be considered a tangi-
ble employment action, regardless of the motive behind the
assignments. Likewise, other sales supervisors routinely have
unlimited discretion to assign territories to employees. This
supervisor would thus be held within the scope of employment
regardless of the malice he feels towards the plaintiff.230 Al-
though poor work assignments could meet the improper inter-
ference test in some circumstances, a court would never reach
that question in this hypothetical because the plaintiffs claim
fails under the first test-whether the defendant acted outside
the scope of his employment.
The common denominator in the three scenarios is that the
employees were dismissed for poor performance by supervisors
who did not like them. Proponents of the at-will doctrine--and
228. Compare Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-65 (adopting and defining the con-
cept of "tangible employment action" for determining employer vicarious liabil-
ity), with Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801-08 (1998) (discuss-
ing the rationale for holding employers vicariously liable under the tangible
employment action concept as compared with the Restatement (Second) of
Agency approach).
229. See supra Part Il.A.
230. Cf. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790 (noting that "work assignment[s]" are
within the concept of tangible employment actions for the purpose of establish-
ing employer liability).
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critics of the tortious interference claim in an at-will setting-
see tortious interference claims as limiting an employer's power
to fire an employee for any reason. 231 If a bad reason for termi-
nation can subject a supervisor to liability, it necessarily limits
his ability to dismiss employees for any reason. As the applica-
tion of the proposed approach demonstrates, however, the suc-
cess of a tortious interference claim will depend on how se-
verely the supervisor's malice influences his conduct. While
each of the three plaintiffs may invoke sympathy, only the first
two will have meritorious claims.
Therefore, if a court applies a modified agency scope of em-
ployment test before inquiring whether there was improper in-
terference, it should not even reach the question of improper
interference, provided the defendant had the authority to ter-
minate an at-will employee, and the means for carrying out the
termination did not exceed the scope of his authority.232 A
proper application of agency law serves to protect both the in-
terests of a wrongfully terminated at-will employee and the
broad thrust of the entire at-will doctrine. Employers need not
fear the uncertainty of a tortious interference claim, and the
truly aggrieved plaintiff can find needed relief.
CONCLUSION
There is considerable obscurity surrounding tortious inter-
ference claims in the employment-at-will context. In addition
to the difficulty in determining whether an at-will contract can
even be interfered with, the relationship between a corporate
employer and its supervisors makes it hard to distinguish be-
tween the supervisor and the employer. Courts that have al-
lowed tortious interference claims to proceed-as well as those
that have not-have based their decisions on conflicting analy-
ses of whether a supervisor is a third party and whether that
supervisor acted improperly.
Established principles of contract, tort, and agency law
shed a great deal of light on tortious interference claims in an
at-will setting. While courts accept the general value of the at-
will rule, they nevertheless recognize the existence of certain
exceptions, especially when the employer's actions offend public
policy. Allowing tortious interference claims in the at-will set-
ting is a logical extension of these public policy exceptions-it
231. See supra note 175.
232. See supra Part III.A.
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provides much-needed relief to plaintiffs who are unable to find
it in current law.
Moreover, the incorporation of agency law into the analy-
ses of tortious interference claims in an at-will setting protects
employers, because it provides a strict test to determine
whether a terminating supervisor is a bona fide third party.
Only the most egregious acts will place a supervisor outside the
scope of his employment, and therefore only the most deserving
claims will be permitted to proceed. Thus, the best way to ap-
proach claims of tortious interference in an at-will setting-the
way that provides for both the appropriate level of protection
for employers and the redress of substantial wrongs for termi-
nated employees-is not to apply just contract law, nor even a
combination of contract and tort law. To settle these claims
fairly and consistently, the courts must apply agency law as the
connecting pin between tort and contract law: They must look
first to scope of employment and only then proceed to the inter-
ference claims themselves.
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